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Abstract
We examine the historical dynamics of government debt in Post-Unification Italy,
from 1861 to 2009. Unit root tests for the debt-GDP ratio are unable to reject either
the non-stationarity or the stationarity null hypothesis. Controlling debt dynamics
for fiscal feedback policies of the Barro-Bohn style, however, the debt-GDP ratio is
found to be mean-reverting. Mean-reversion in the debt-GDP ratio is due not only
to a nominal growth dividend, but also to a positive response of primary surpluses
to variations in outstanding debt. There is indeed significant evidence that, over
the history of Italy, fiscal policy makers have reacted to the accumulation of debt,
taking corrective measures to rule out potential long-term sustainability problems.
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“Now I believe that one really imposes burdens on taxpayers not when one votes taxes, but
when one votes expenditures”.
Quintino Sella, Finance Minister (Italian House of Representatives, December 11, 1872 ).
1 Introduction
The Italy‘s nominal public debt is the third largest in the world after the United States
and Japan.1 The Italy’s public debt-GDP ratio is the eleventh largest in the world after
Liberia, Japan, St. Kitts and Nevis, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, the Democratic Republic
of Congo, Jamaica, Seychelles, Grenada, and Antigua and Barbuda.2
Debt and deficits in Italy have sharply increased following the Great Recession started
in 2007. The sustainability of the Italian fiscal policy has thus turned to be a critical issue.
In current public policy debates, it is often argued that the 2009-2010 debt crisis occurred
in Greece and Ireland could generate contagion and moral hazard problems in other Euro
Area Member States, notably Portugal, Spain, and Italy.
Did Italy’s fiscal policy makers react to debt accumulation in the past? Is Italy’s
public debt on a sustainable path? In this paper we examine the historical dynamics of
government debt in Post-Unification Italy, from 1861 to 2009.
In 1861, the first Finance Minister of the Kingdom of Italy, Pietro Bastogi, set up the
“Gran Libro del Debito Pubblico Italiano” to incorporate the debts of all the existent
states before the Unification. Thereafter, with the exception of the first three years of
the new Kingdom (from 1861 to 1863), of one year over the Fascist period (1926), and
of the first thirty-six years over the post-World War II period (from 1946 to 1981), the
time series of the Italian debt-GDP ratio has well been above 0.6, the threshold value
established in the Maastricht Treaty; see Figure 1.
Stationarity in the debt-GDP ratio, as emphasized by Bohn (2007), appears to be the
most relevant econometric condition to check whether fiscal policy is sustainable or may
1See International Monetary Fund (2010).
2See Abbas, Belhocine, ElGanainy, and Horton (2010).
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generate potential solvency problems.3 It is in fact empirically implausible, as emphasized
by Chung, Davig and Leeper (2007), that the debt-GDP ratio can grow without limit and,
at the same time, be perceived by economic agents as sustainable.
Table 1 displays unit root tests for the Italy’s debt-GDP ratio in the Post-Unification
period. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests examine
the null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative hypothesis of stationarity.4 The
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test examines the null hypothesis of station-
arity against the alternative hypothesis of a unit root.5
The results over the whole period are puzzling. The ADF and PP tests are in favor
of the non-stationarity null hypothesis for the debt-GDP ratio.6 The KPSS is instead in
favor of the stationarity null hypothesis. The conflicting results also hold over remarkable
sub-periods. For example, in Table 1 they are shown to hold over the whole sample
excluding world war-time periods (from 1914 to 1919, and from 1939 to 1947), up to the
World War I (from 1861 to 1913), and up to the World War II (from 1861 to 1938).7
Therefore, the ADF and PP tests seem to suggest absence of corrective measures by
Italy’s fiscal policy makers, and hence potential debt sustainability problems, for economic
agents are likely to perceive the non-stationary debt dynamics as unrelated to fundamen-
tals. The KPSS test, by contrast, seems to suggest no potential sustainability problems
at all.
3Specifically, Bohn (2007) demonstrates that deriving sustainability tests from the government’s in-
tertemporal budget constraint imposes very weak econometric restrictions for testing the sustainability
hypothesis. This is essentially because the intertemporal budget constraint is fully satisfied by govern-
ment policies that let the debt-GDP ratio increase exponentially at a rate just marginally below the
discount rate. The government’s intertemporal budget constraint hence turns out to be satisfied even if
the debt-GDP ratio is stationary after any finite number of diﬀerencing operations.
4See Hamilton (1994).
5See Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (1992).
6This finding continues to apply taking into account the possibility of structural breaks. The Clemente-
Montañés-Reyes unit root test (see Clemente, Montañés, and Reyes, 1998) using the “additive outlier”
model (CLEMAO) with one endogenous structural break gives a t-value of −2.599, greater than the
critical 5 percent value of −3.560, signaling the optimal breakpoint in 1917. The CLEMAO test with
two endogenous structural breaks gives a t-value of −4.980, greater than the critical 5 percent value of
−5.490, signaling the optimal breakpoints in 1948 and 1986.
7ADF, PP and KPSS tests give however unambiguous results, in favor of the non-stationarity hypoth-
esis, over the sample up to the 1991 global recession and the Maastricht Treaty (from 1861 to 1990), even
excluding world war-time periods, and over the post-World War II sample (from 1948 to 2009). Galli
and Padovano (2008) also find evidence of non-stationarity over the period from 1950 to 2002.
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However, unit root tests arguably do not control for the behavior of governments’
primary surpluses, as first shown by Bohn (1998) for the U.S. fiscal history. Then we
incorporate the main determinants of primary-surplus policies, based on tax-smoothing
theory (Barro, 1979, 1986), into the government’s budget constraint. This yields a dy-
namic equation in the debt-GDP ratio that can be estimated in order to detect stability
or instability. We find significant evidence of mean-reversion in the debt-GDP ratio. The
result is robust over several sub-periods. We show how mean-reversion in the debt-GDP
ratio comes not only from a nominal growth dividend, but also from a positive response of
primary surpluses to variations in outstanding debt. We indeed find significant evidence
that, over the history of Italy, fiscal policy makers have reacted to the accumulation of
debt, taking corrective actions to rule out potential sustainability problems.
The scheme of the paper is as follows. Section 2 investigates the relationship between
debt and primary surpluses and derives the implications for the dynamics of Italy’s gov-
ernment debt. Section 3 extends the analysis by incorporating inertia in the fiscal policy
adjustment process in response to increases in debt. Section 4 summarizes the main
conclusions.
2 Fiscal Feedback Policies and Debt Dynamics
In the Introduction we have pointed out that unit root tests for the Italy’s debt-GDP
ratio yield conflicting results. Neither the null hypothesis of a unit root, in the case of
ADF and PP tests, nor the null hypothesis of stationarity, in the case of the KPSS test,
can significantly be rejected. Unit root tests, however, arguably abstract from economic
theory. Specifically, they do not control for the determinants of primary surpluses, as first
shown by Bohn (1998) for the U.S. fiscal history.
To illustrate this point in a transparent way, consider first the government’s budget
identity, Bt = (1 + it)Bt−1 + Gt − Tt, describing how the nominal public debt Bt at the
end of period t depends on the nominal interest rate it, the previous period’s nominal
public debt Bt−1, the non-interest public spending Gt, and total revenues Tt. Define the
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government’s primary surplus as St = Tt − Gt. Then divide both sides of the budget
identity by the nominal GDP Yt to get the law of motion of the debt-GDP ratio,
bt = (1 + r) bt−1 − st, (1)
where bt = Bt/Yt, st = St/Yt, and r = (1 + it) / (1 + nt) is the nominal interest rate
deflated by the nominal growth rate, nt = (Yt − Yt−1) /Yt−1. The assumption of a fixed
after-growth interest rate r is common in the literature, and here is adopted only to make
the argument as transparent as possible, without loss of generality. Suppose now that the
primary surplus-GDP ratio is an increasing function of the outstanding debt-GDP ratio.
Specifically, consider a policy function of the form
st = ρbt−1 +αZt + εt, (2)
where ρ > 0 captures the degree of reactiveness of the primary surplus to debt, Zt is a
vector of additional determinants of the primary surplus, α is a vector of parameters, and
εt is a mean-zero error term. Substituting (2) into (1) results in the following equation
describing the dynamics of the debt-GDP ratio:
∆bt = (r − ρ) bt−1 + βZt + vt. (3)
where β = −α and vt = −εt. Assume that Zt is stationary. Then the debt-GDP ratio
is mean-reverting if r − ρ < 0. According to (3), standard unit root tests can easily fail
to detect mean-reversion in the debt-GDP ratio for two reasons. First, if r − ρ is strictly
below zero - but not much below zero - unit root tests can easily lead to accept the unit
root null hypothesis. Second, unit root tests are misspecified since they omit Zt, that is,
the non-debt determinants of the primary surplus.
Standard tax-smoothing theory (Barro, 1979, 1986) suggests that Zt should incor-
porate the level of temporary government spending and the level of temporary output.
When government spending is temporarily high, for example because of wars, and/or the
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level of output is temporarily low, for example because of recessions, sudden increases in
tax rates necessary to maintain a balanced budget would bring about unnecessary eco-
nomic distortions, aﬀecting agents’ choices for optimal time paths of labor, production,
consumption, and investment. Therefore, it is optimal for the government to let the debt-
GDP ratio increase in periods of temporarily high levels of spending and/or in periods of
temporarily low levels of output.
This implies an empirical specification for the change in the debt-GDP ratio of the
form
∆bt = γbt−1 + β0 + β1g˜t + β2y˜t + vt, (4)
where g˜t is a measure of temporary government spending, y˜t is a measure of tempo-
rary output, and (γ, β0, β1, β2) are regression coeﬃcients. Following Mendoza and Ostry
(2008), we obtain g˜t and y˜t by detrending real government spending and real GDP, using
the Hodrick-Prescott filter with the smoothing parameter equal to 100. The resulting
“government spending gap” g˜t and the “output gap” y˜t are shown in Figures 2-3.
For g˜t, the major peaks are associated with war-time periods: 0.34 during the Third
Italian War of Independence in 1866, 0.12 at the beginning of the African War in Eritrea
in 1888, 0.55 at the end of the World War I in 1918, 0.44 during the World War II in 1941;
peaks are also visible after the Great Depression (0.10 in 1936), at the beginning of the
Italian “economic miracle”, the so-called “Golden Age”, (0.10 in 1953), during the 1970s
stagflation period (0.16 in 1978), after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks (0.16 in
2001), and during the current Great Recession (0.09 in 2009).
For y˜t, the major peaks are again associated with war-time periods: 0.09 during the
African War in 1891, 0.13 at the end of the World War I in 1918, 0.18 at the beginning
of the World War I in 1939, −0.44 at the end of the World War II; peaks are also visible
after the breakdown of trade relations between Italy and France (−0.11 in 1889), at the
beginning of the Golden Age (0.05 in 1951), and during the current Great Recession
(−0.05 in 2009).
Table 2 shows estimates of equation (4). All estimates use Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS). Both ordinary and robust t-statistics are displayed, to take into account het-
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erosckedasticity and autocorrelation in residuals. Robust t-statistics are computed using
the Newey-West (Newey and West, 1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consis-
tent covariance matrix. Regression 1 shows the results for the whole sample period from
1861 to 2009. Regression 2 excludes the World War I period (from 1914 to 1919) and the
World War II period (from 1939 to 1947). Regression 3 shows the results up to the World
War I (from 1861 to 1913). Regression 4 shows the results up to the World War II (from
1861 to 1938). Regression 5 shows the results up to the Maastricht period (from 1861 to
1990), excluding world war-time periods in Regression 6. Regression 7 shows the results
for the post-World War II period (from 1948 to 2009).
For Regression 1 in Table 2, the γ coeﬃcient on the lagged debt-GDP ratio bt−1 is sig-
nificantly negative (−0.036, with robust t-statistic = −2.087), in favor of mean-reversion
in the debt-GDP ratio. The β1 coeﬃcient on the temporary spending g˜t is significantly
positive (0.198, with robust t-statistic = 3.439), consistently with tax smoothing. The β2
coeﬃcient on the temporary output y˜t insignificantly diﬀers from zero (0.041, with robust
t-statistic = 0.205).
Excluding world war-time periods, the mean-reversion result is more pronounced, and
a positive eﬀect of temporary declines in output on debt accumulation is detected, con-
sistently with tax smoothing. From Regression 2 in Table 2, in fact, the coeﬃcient on the
lagged debt-GDP ratio is significantly negative (−0.042, with robust t-statistic = −2.229).
The coeﬃcient on the temporary spending is again significantly positive (0.208, with ro-
bust t-statistic = 3.314). The coeﬃcient on the temporary output is now significantly
negative (−0.529, with robust t-statistic = −2.504).
The general result of mean-reversion in the debt-GDP ratio holds over the sub-periods
considered in Regressions 3-6 in Table 2.8
Let us also use an alternative measure of temporary government spending and tempo-
rary output, based on the closed-form solution of Barro’s (1986) tax-smoothing framework.
The two measures are referred asGVARt for government spending and Y V ARt for output,
8Regression 7 indicates, instead, a countercyclical fiscal response over the post-World War II with no
statistically significant evidence of mean-reversion in the debt-GDP ratio.
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and are given by GVARt =
¡
gt − gTt
¢
/yt and Y V ARt =
¡
gTt /yt
¢ £¡
yTt − yt
¢
/yt
¤
, where
gt is real government spending, yt is real output, and gTt and yTt are corresponding trend
values. A positive value of Y V ARt now denotes a period of temporary recession while
a negative value denotes a period of temporary expansion. As for g˜t and y˜t, trends are
obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with the smoothing parameter equal to 100.9
The resulting GVARt and Y V ARt for Italy are shown in Figures 4-5. The empirical
specification for the change in the debt-GDP ratio is now
∆bt = γbt−1 + β0 + β1GVARt + β2Y V ARt + vt, (5)
Table 3 shows estimates of equation (5). Mean-reversion in the debt-GDP ratio con-
tinues to be detected for Regressions 1-6 in Table 3. For example, for Regression 1, which
considers the whole sample 1861-2009, the γ coeﬃcient on bt−1 is significantly negative
(−0.035, with robust t-statistic = −2.179); the β1 coeﬃcient on GVARt is significantly
positive (0.819, with robust t-statistic = 3.275), as Barro’s (1986) framework predicts; the
β2 coeﬃcient on Y V ARt insignificantly diﬀers from zero (−0.125, with robust t-statistic
= −0.373), but becomes significantly positive in Regressions 2-4 and 6-7, consistently
with tax smoothing.
To see why mean-reversion in the debt-GDP ratio is detected, recall the definition of
the coeﬃcient on bt−1 in equation (4), γ = r − ρ, where r is the nominal interest rate
on government debt net of the growth rate of the nominal GDP, and ρ is the feedback
response of the primary surplus-GDP ratio to increases in the debt-GDP ratio. Let
first concentrate on the after-growth interest rate, r. Consistently with Bohn (2008), let
calculate the nominal interest rate on debt it as the ratio of interest payments for period t
over the average of the stock of nominal debt at the end of period t and at the end of period
t−1.10 For the whole sample, the average nominal interest rate on debt is 4.9 percent; the
9Bohn (2008) measures temporary government spending for the U.S. as the diﬀerence between the
actual and the estimated permanent military spending-GDP ratio. For the U.S. fiscal history, fluctua-
tions are in fact dominated by military spending. For the Italy’s fiscal history, however, fluctuations in
government spending are not only dominated by military spending. Therefore, following Mendoza and
Ostry (2008), we continue to use a standard measure for gt − gTt .
10Computing the nominal interest rate in this way enables us to take into account the fact that gov-
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average nominal GDP-growth rate is 10.2 percent, more than 3/4 due to inflation and less
than 1/4 due to real GDP growth;11 thus, r = (1 + 0.049) / (1 + 0.102)−1 ≈ −0.048 < 0.
This implies that the “nominal growth dividend” has exceeded the interest cost on public
debt, preventing per se the debt-GDP ratio from embarking on unstable paths.
Let now focus on the degree of reaction of primary surpluses to increases in debt, ρ.
Figure 6 shows the historical behavior of the primary surplus-GDP ratio. Negative peaks
are dominated by the world war-time periods. Positive increases are particularly visible
from 1869 to 1876 during the “Historical Right” period, from 1922 to 1927 during the
Fascist period, from 1952 to 1957 during the Golden Age, from 1991 to 1997 during the
Maastricht period, from 2002 to 2004 during the second Berlusconi’s government, and
from 2006 to 2008 during the last Prodi’s government. Table 4 shows estimates of the
policy function
st = ρbt−1 + α0 + α1g˜t + α2y˜t + εt, (6)
where (ρ, α0, α1, α2) are regression coeﬃcients. The ρ coeﬃcient on the outstanding debt-
GDP ratio is positive and highly significant in all Regressions. For example, for Regression
1 in Table 4 the ρ-value is 0.076 (with robust t-statistic = 3.032). This means that an
increase in the debt-GDP ratio, say, by 10 percentage points has implied an increase in
the primary surplus-GDP ratio by 0.76 percentage points on average. The variable g˜t
enters negatively (−0.309, with robust t-statistic = −3.115) and the variable y˜t enters
positively (0.447, with robust t-statistic = 1.671), consistently with tax smoothing. A
significantly positive value of ρ is also detected substituting the measures g˜t and y˜t with
GVARt and Y V ARt; see Table 5.
As a consequence, mean-reversion in the debt-GDP ratio is due not only to a nominal
growth dividend, but also to a positive response of primary surpluses to variations in the
outstanding debt. This positive response is suﬃcient for long-term sustainability of Italy’s
fiscal policy.
ernment debt is composed of a portfolio of securities with diﬀerent interest rates.
11Specifically, the average percentage increase in the GDP deflator is 7.7 percent while the average
percentage increase in real GDP is 2.5 percent.
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3 Incorporating Fiscal Policy Inertia
It is worth generalizing the above analysis to account for a potential inertia in the reaction
of the primary surplus to debt accumulation. Specifically, consider a policy function of
the form
st = δst−1 + (1− δ) ρbt−1 +αZt + εt, (7)
where 0 < δ < 1 is a parameter capturing the gradual adjustment of the primary surplus
to debt. Combining (7) with (1) now yields
xt = Jxt−1 + ut, (8)
where
xt =
⎛
⎝ bt
st
⎞
⎠ , ut =
⎛
⎝ −αZt − εt
αZt + εt
⎞
⎠ ,
and
J =
⎛
⎝ (1 + r)− (1− δ) ρ −δ
(1− δ) ρ δ
⎞
⎠ . (9)
The characteristic polynomial of J is P(λ) = λ2−TrJλ+DetJ. Stability requires that the
two roots lie inside the unit circle. This applies if and only if the following conditions are
satisfied:12
|DetJ| < 1, (10)
1 +TrJ+DetJ > 0, (11)
1− TrJ+DetJ > 0. (12)
From (9), TrJ =(1 + r) − (1− δ) ρ + δ and DetJ =(1 + r) δ. It follows that conditions
(10)-(12) are satisfied if and only if
δ (1 + r) < 1, (13)
12See LaSalle (1986).
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ρ <
(1 + r) (1 + δ)
(1− δ) , (14)
ρ− r > 0. (15)
Table 6 shows estimates of the policy function
st = δst−1 + φbt−1 + α0 + α1g˜t + α2y˜t + εt. (16)
UsingGVARt and Y V ARt instead of g˜t and y˜t yields estimates reported in Table 7. The φ
coeﬃcient on the lagged debt-GDP ratio is significantly positive in Regressions 1-4 and 6-7
in Tables 6-7. Over the full sample period 1861-2009, the φ-value is approximately equal
to 0.015 (0.014 with robust t-statistic = 1.753 for Regression 1 in Table 6, and 0.019 with
robust t-statistic = 2.154 for Regression 1 in Table 7). With a δ-value approximately
equal to 0.85 (0.860 with robust t-statistic = 18.198 for Regression 1 in Table 6, and
0.825 with robust t-statistic = 16.393 for Regression 1 in Table 7), this implies a ρ-value
approximately equal to 0.015/(1− 0.85) ≈ 0.1, which is remarkably comparable with the
ρ-values displayed in Tables 4-5. This means that an increase in the debt-GDP ratio, for
instance, by 10 percentage points generates an increase in the primary surplus-GDP ratio
by 1 percentage point in the long run.
Conditions for stability (10)-(12) are verified. Condition (10) is satisfied because δ
is lower than unity and Italy’s nominal interest rates have been below Italy’s nominal
GDP-growth rates on average, implying r < 0. Condition (11) is satisfied because the
values of φ = (1− δ) ρ are largely below unity. Finally, condition (12) is satisfied because
beyond the occurrence of a nominal growth dividend, ρ is significantly positive.
4 Conclusions
The paper has analyzed Italy’s long-term budget data. Unit root tests for the debt-GDP
ratio are unable to reject either the null hypothesis of stationarity or the null hypothesis
of non-stationarity. Then we have controlled for fiscal feedback policies à la Barro-Bohn,
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based on tax-smoothing theory. We have found significant evidence of mean-reversion
in the debt-GDP ratio. We have shown how mean-reversion reflects not only a nominal
growth dividend, but also a positive reaction of primary surpluses to increases in debt.
The results thus favor the hypothesis of long-term sustainability in Italy’s fiscal policy
making.
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Appendix: Description of the Data
The debt series bt is obtained by dividing the end-of-period central government nominal
debt (Fratianni and Spinelli (2001) from 1861 to 1998; Bank of Italy, Relazione Annuale,
from 1999 to 2009) by nominal GDP (Obstfeld and Jones (2001) from 1861 to 1889; Rossi,
Sorgato, and Toniolo (1993), from 1890 to 1970; Bank of Italy, Relazione Annuale, from
1971 to 2009).
The primary surplus series st is obtained by dividing the diﬀerence of central gov-
ernment nominal revenues (Repaci (1962) from 1862 to 1952; Bank of Italy, Relazione
Annuale, from 1953 to 2009) and central government nominal outlays (Repaci (1962)
from 1862 to 1952; Bank of Italy, Relazione Annuale, from 1953 to 2009) net of interest
payments on debt (Fratianni e Spinelli (2001) from 1862 to 1998; Bank of Italy, Relazione
Annuale, from 1999 to 2009) by nominal GDP.
The real government spending series gt is obtained by dividing central government
nominal outlays by the GDP deflator (Fratianni and Spinelli (2001) from 1861 to 1998;
ISTAT, Bollettino Statistico, from 1999 to 2009).
The real GDP series yt is obtained by dividing the nominal GDP by the GDP deflator.
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Figure 1: The Italy’s government debt-GDP ratio, 1861-2009.
Note: The graph shows the Italy’s debt-GDP ratio series bt described in the Appendix.
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Figure 2: The Italy’s temporary government spending g˜t, 1862-2009.
Note: The graph shows the Italy’s temporary government spending, obtained by detrending the
real government spending series gt described in the Appendix, using the Hodrick-Prescott filter
with the smoothing parameter equal to 100.
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Figure 3: The Italy’s temporary output y˜t, 1861-2009.
Note: The graph shows the Italy’s temporary output, obtained by detrending the real GDP series
yt described in the Appendix, using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with the smoothing parameter
equal to 100.
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Figure 4: The Italy’s temporary government spending GVARt, 1862-2009.
Notes: The graph shows the Italy’s temporary government spending based on Barro’s (1986)
model, according to which GVARt =
¡
gt − gTt
¢
/yt, where gt and yt are the real government
spending series and the real GDP series, respectively, described in the Appendix; gTt represents
the trend of the gt series; the trend is obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with the
smoothing parameter equal to 100.
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Figure 5: The Italy’s temporary output Y V ARt, 1861-2009.
Notes: The graph shows the Italy’s temporary output based on Barro’s (1986) model, according
to which Y V ARt =
¡
gTt /yt
¢ £¡
yTt − yt
¢
/yt
¤
, where yt is the real GDP series described in the
Appendix; yTt and gTt represent the trends of the real government spending series gt and the real
GDP series yt described in the Appendix; the trends are obtained using the Hodrick-Prescott
filter with the smoothing parameter equal to 100.
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Figure 6: The Italy’s primary surplus-GDP ratio, 1862-2009.
Note: The graph shows the Italy’s primary surplus-GDP ratio series st described in the Appen-
dix.
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Table 1: Unit root tests for the debt-GDP ratio.
Sample ADF PP KPSS
(1) 1861-2009 −1.914
(−3.475)
[−2.881]
−1.884
(−3.475)
[−2.881]
0.347
(0.739)
[0.463]
(2) 1861-2009
excl. 14-19, 39-47
−2.056
(−3.480)
[−2.883]
−2.141
(−3.480)
[−2.883]
0.319
(0.739)
[0.463]
(3) 1861-1913 −2.878
(−3.563)
[−2.919]
−2.883
(−3.563)
[−2.919]
0.294
(0.739)
[0.463]
(4) 1861-1938 −2.923
(−3.518)
[−2.900]
−2.967
(−3.518)
[−2.900]
0.262
(0.739)
[0.463]
(5) 1861-1990 −1.847
(−3.482)
[−2.884]
−1.792
(−3.482)
[−2.884]
0.759
(0.739)
[0.463]
(6) 1861-1990
excl. 14-19, 39-47
−1.973
(−3.489)
[−2.887]
−2.029
(−3.489)
[−2.887]
0.660
(0.739)
[0.463]
(7) 1948-2009 −0.622
(−3.540)
[−2.909]
−0.406
(−3.540)
[−2.909]
0.844
(0.739)
[0.463]
Notes: ADF = Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with intercept and lag length selected according to
the Schwarz Information Criterion (maximum lags = 4); PP = Phillips-Perron test with intercept
and Newey-West bandwidth using Bartlett kernel; KPSS = Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin
test with intercept and Newey-West bandwidth using Bartlett kernel; ( ) = critical values at 1%
significance level; [ ] = critical values at 5% significance level.
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Table 2: Regression results for the change in the debt-GDP ratio, using g˜t and y˜t.
Equation for ∆bt
Sample Const. bt−1 g˜t y˜t R2 DW
(1) 1861-2009 0.035
(2.323)
[2.116]
−0.036
(−2.059)
[−2.087]
0.198
(4.730)
[3.439]
0.041
(0.397)
[0.205]
0.188 1.652
(2) 1861-2009
excl. 14-19, 39-47
0.043
(3.320)
[2.536]
−0.042
(−2.735)
[−2.229]
0.208
(4.440)
[3.314]
−0.529
(−3.119)
[−2.504]
0.195 1.459
(3) 1861-1913 0.193
(4.193)
[4.389]
−0.186
(−4.054)
[−4.281]
0.262
(3.708)
[4.473]
−0.538
(−1.988)
[−2.225]
0.347 1.870
(4) 1861-1938 0.193
(4.924)
[6.139]
−0.196
(−4.782)
[−5.613]
0.282
(5.457)
[4.694]
−0.772
(−3.746)
[−3.247]
0.377 1.749
(5) 1861-1990 0.036
(2.241)
[2.162]
−0.039
(−1.999)
[−2.153]
0.199
(4.451)
[3.302]
0.049
(0.452)
[0.252]
0.197 1.706
(6) 1861-1990
excl. 14-19, 39-47
0.044
(3.131)
[2.502]
−0.044
(−2.538)
[−2.184]
0.210
(4.142)
[3.165]
−0.512
(−2.805)
[−2.323]
0.197 1.524
(7) 1948-2009 0.017
(2.000)
[1.393]
−0.004
(−0.336)
[−0.202]
0.062
(0.948)
[0.942]
−0.512
(−2.418)
[−2.463]
0.103 0.710
Notes: OLS estimates with annual data; ( ) = ordinary t-statistics; [ ] = robust t-statistics,
computed using the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance
matrix with lag truncation q = floor
³
4 (T/100)
2
9
´
, where T is the number of observations; DW
= Durbin-Watson statistic.
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Table 3: Regression results for the change in the debt-GDP ratio, using GVARt and
Y V ARt.
Equation for ∆bt
Sample Const. bt−1 GVARt Y V ARt R2 DW
(1) 1861-2009 0.034
(2.282)
[2.244]
−0.035
(−2.033)
[−2.179]
0.819
(4.393)
[3.275]
−0.125
(−0.406)
[−0.373]
0.197 1.747
(2) 1861-2009
excl. 14-19, 39-47
0.042
(3.104)
[2.551]
−0.041
(−2.606)
[−2.302]
0.912
(3.696)
[2.952]
2.161
(2.501)
[1.746]
0.155 1.535
(3) 1861-1913 0.194
(4.053)
[4.090]
−0.187
(−3.931)
[−4.010]
1.439
(3.293)
[3.664]
4.013
(1.943)
[2.323]
0.313 1.881
(4) 1861-1938 0.181
(4.481)
[5.779]
−0.186
(−4.387)
[−5.565]
1.289
(4.783)
[3.951]
3.867
(3.441)
[2.312]
0.326 1.735
(5) 1861-1990 0.035
(2.077)
[2.309]
−0.039
(−1.952)
[−2.261]
0.842
(4.055)
[3.086]
−0.123
(−0.765)
[−0.367]
0.207 1.803
(6) 1861-1990
excl. 14-19, 39-47
0.042
(2.961)
[2.522]
−0.044
(−2.448)
[−2.292]
0.979
(3.473)
[2.720]
2.076
(2.136)
[1.489]
0.156 1.599
(7) 1948-2009 0.016
(1.991)
[1.425]
−0.004
(−0.344)
[−0.186]
0.309
(1.291)
[0.048]
2.140
(2.696)
[2.593]
0.136 0.703
Notes: OLS estimates with annual data; ( ) = ordinary t-statistics; [ ] = robust t-statistics,
computed using the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance
matrix with lag truncation q = floor
³
4 (T/100)
2
9
´
, where T is the number of observations; DW
= Durbin-Watson statistic.
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Table 4: Regression results for the primary surplus-GDP ratio, using g˜t and y˜t.
Equation for st
Sample Const. bt−1 g˜t y˜t R2 DW
(1) 1861-2009 −0.099
(−6.826)
[−4.456]
0.076
(4.472)
[3.032]
−0.309
(−7.577)
[−3.115]
0.447
(4.470)
[1.671]
0.330 0.194
(2) 1861-2009
excl. 14-19, 39-47
−0.082
(−8.438)
[−5.063]
0.079
(6.985)
[4.617]
−0.097
(−2.801)
[−2.658]
0.211
(1.687)
[0.808]
0.300 0.235
(3) 1861-1913 −0.080
(−8.598)
[−5.058]
0.097
(10.488)
[6.468]
−0.012
(−0.871)
[−0.477]
0.055
(1.009)
[1.348]
0.705 1.376
(4) 1861-1938 −0.146
(−4.037)
[−2.837]
0.135
(3.550)
[2.831]
−0.267
(−5.586)
[−2.326]
−0.069
(−0.360)
[−0.229]
0.385 0.238
(5) 1861-1990 −0.093
(−6.014)
[−4.146]
0.064
(3.327)
[2.137]
−0.307
(−7.021)
[−3.125]
0.442
(4.161)
[1.686]
0.309 0.187
(6) 1861-1990
excl. 14-19, 39-47
−0.080
(−7.681)
[−4.921]
0.076
(5.882)
[3.906]
−0.086
(−2.269)
[−2.198]
0.209
(1.541)
[0.777]
0.263 0.209
(7) 1948-2009 −0.077
(−6.967)
[−4.460]
0.061
(3.919)
[2.798]
−0.201
(−2.359)
[−2.847]
0.188
(0.681)
[0.589]
0.264 0.189
Notes: OLS estimates with annual data; ( ) = ordinary t-statistics; [ ] = robust t-statistics,
computed using the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance
matrix with lag truncation q = floor
³
4 (T/100)
2
9
´
, where T is the number of observations; DW
= Durbin-Watson statistic.
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Table 5: Regression results for the primary surplus-GDP ratio, usingGVARt and Y V ARt.
Equation for st
Sample Const. bt−1 GV ARt Y V ARt R2 DW
(1) 1861-2009 −0.099
(−7.530)
[−4.624]
0.080
(5.171)
[3.369]
−1.583
(−9.532)
[−3.937]
−2.192
(−7.998)
[−4.361]
0.443 0.249
(2) 1861-2009
excl. 14-19, 39-47
−0.083
(−8.765)
[−5.037]
0.081
(7.272)
[4.662]
−0.578
(−3.328)
[−3.135]
−1.515
(−2.490)
[−0.939]
0.332 0.216
(3) 1861-1913 −0.079
(−8.444)
[−4.995]
0.097
(10.355)
[6.434]
−0.059
(−0.688)
[−0.464]
−0.458
(−1.127)
[−1.510]
0.705 1.394
(4) 1861-1938 −0.140
(−4.238)
[−3.113]
0.130
(3.747)
[3.096]
−1.506
(−6.829)
[−2.679]
−0.296
(−0.322)
[−0.145]
0.479 0.241
(5) 1861-1990 −0.095
(−6.761)
[−4.323]
0.071
(4.058)
[2.518]
−1.614
(−8.920)
[−3.971]
−2.216
(−7.564)
[−4.484
0.429 0.240
(6) 1861-1990
excl. 14-19, 39-47
−0.082
(−7.992)
[−4.882]
0.078
(6.173)
[4.029]
−0.508
(−2.534)
[−2.527]
−1.684
(−2.437)
[−0.937]
0.294 0.205
(7) 1948-2009 −0.078
(−7.207)
[−4.613]
0.062
(4.066)
[2.953]
−0.865
(−2.771)
[−3.483]
−0.866
(−0.836)
[−0.590]
0.291 0.186
Notes: OLS estimates with annual data; ( ) = ordinary t-statistics; [ ] = robust t-statistics,
computed using the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance
matrix with lag truncation q = floor
³
4 (T/100)
2
9
´
, where T is the number of observations; DW
= Durbin-Watson statistic.
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Table 6: Regression results for the primary surplus-GDP ratio, using g˜t and y˜t, and in
the presence of inertia.
Equation for st
Sample Const. st−1 bt−1 g˜t y˜t R2 DW
(1) 1861-2009 −0.017
(−2.587)
[−2.306]
0.860
(27.279)
[18.198]
0.014
(1.988)
[1.753]
−0.103
(−5.678)
[−3.623]
0.034
(0.798)
[0.476]
0.893 1.214
(2) 1861-2009
excl. 14-19, 39-47
−0.021
(−4.044)
[−3.240]
0.769
(21.787)
[16.965]
0.023
(3.865)
[3.209]
−0.066
(−4.128)
[−2.712]
0.083
(1.417)
[1.639]
0.852 1.826
(3) 1861-1913 −0.038
(−2.869)
[−1.513]
0.458
(3.937)
[2.335]
0.048
(3.253)
[1.746]
−0.009
(−0.708)
[−0.342]
0.019
(0.387)
[0.762]
0.738 2.528
(4) 1861-1938 −0.044
(−2.619)
[−1.875]
0.838
(19.169)
[15.246]
0.043
(2.488)
[1.956]
−0.069
(−3.105)
[−2.359]
−0.122
(−1.570)
[−1.759]
0.900 0.999
(5) 1861-1990 −0.015
(−2.170)
[−1.937]
0.873
(26.488)
[17.752]
0.011
(1.431)
[1.244]
−0.094
(−5.022)
[−3.318]
0.015
(0.331)
[0.202]
0.897 1.172
(6) 1861-1990
excl. 14-19, 39-47
−0.019
(−3.607)
[−2.816]
0.792
(22.094)
[16.684]
0.020
(3.326)
[2.685]
−0.057
(−3.481)
[−2.349]
0.049
(0.837)
[1.134]
0.866 1.848
(7) 1948-2009 −0.018
(−2.780)
[−2.681]
0.825
(14.602)
[16.882]
0.019
(2.369)
[2.556]
−0.194
(−4.919)
[−5.407]
0.388
(3.010)
[4.408]
0.845 1.772
Notes: OLS estimates with annual data; ( ) = ordinary t-statistics; [ ] = robust t-statistics,
computed using the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance
matrix with lag truncation q = floor
³
4 (T/100)
2
9
´
, where T is the number of observations; DW
= Durbin-Watson statistic.
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Table 7: Regression results for the primary surplus-GDP ratio, usingGVARt and Y V ARt,
and in the presence of inertia.
Equation for st
Sample Const. st−1 bt−1 GVARt Y V ARt R2 DW
(1) 1861-2009 −0.021
(−3.270)
[−2.703]
0.825
(25.424)
[16.393]
0.019
(2.634)
[2.154]
−0.569
(−6.987)
[−4.374]
−0.470
(−3.475)
[−2.080]
0.900 1.082
(2) 1861-2009
excl. 14-19, 39-47
−0.023
(−4.404)
[−3.260]
0.760
(22.086)
[16.085]
0.024
(4.182)
[3.196]
−0.405
(−5.059)
[−2.956]
−0.548
(−1.944)
[−1.806]
0.862 1.700
(3) 1861-1913 −0.037
(−2.787)
[−1.469]
0.455
(3.905)
[2.330]
0.047
(3.190)
[1.714]
−0.029
(−0.375)
[−0.227]
−0.192
(−0.529)
[−1.027]
0.737 2.563
(4) 1861-1938 −0.042
(−2.552)
[−2.008]
0.816
(17.855)
[14.278]
0.041
(2.422)
[2.103]
−0.356
(−3.088)
[−2.138]
0.667
(1.661)
[1.713]
0.905 1.014
(5) 1861-1990 −0.019
(−2.826)
[−2.319]
0.838
(24.387)
[15.547]
0.016
(2.046)
[1.632]
−0.538
(−6.148)
[−3.844]
−0.410
(−2.872)
[−1.683]
0.902 1.040
(6) 1861-1990
excl. 14-19, 39-47
−0.020
(−3.824)
[−2.811]
0.786
(22.116)
[16.210]
0.021
(3.493)
[2.649]
−0.357
(−4.128)
[−2.328]
−0.317
(−1.044)
[−1.119]
0.872 1.728
(7) 1948-2009 −0.019
(−2.943)
[−2.819]
0.806
(14.336)
[15.815]
0.020
(2.522)
[2.746]
−0.727
(−4.943)
[−5.899]
−1.424
(−2.916)
[−3.915]
0.846 1.680
Notes: OLS estimates with annual data; ( ) = ordinary t-statistics; [ ] = robust t-statistics,
computed using the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance
matrix with lag truncation q = floor
³
4 (T/100)
2
9
´
, where T is the number of observations; DW
= Durbin-Watson statistic.
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